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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff/Respondent,

Case No, 92085CA

vs.
CLAUDE L. HAYES
Defendant/Appellant.
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING
This appeal is from a conviction on the charge of aggravated
robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code annotated
76-6-302, rendered by a jury impaneled before the Honorable Stanton
M.Taylor.

Jurisdiction

to hear the above

entitled

appeal

is

conferred upon the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code
annotated, 78-2-2(3)(i) (1953) as amended.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Was the evidence sufficient to establish defendants guilt

of aggravated robbery, after the misidentification of the Defendant
on

two

prior

occasions

by

the

primary

witness

who

testified

concerning the robbery.
2.

Were the statements of the Defendant obtained by Officer

Stubbs imadmissible as a violation of Defendant's rights pusuant to
Miranda v. Arizona 384 U.S. 436, 88 S Ct 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2nd 694
(1966).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Annotated 76-6-3 02 : Aggravated Robbery.
1.

A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of

committing robbery, he:
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as
defined in Section 76-1-601; or
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another.
*********

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal

from a conviction

on the charges of

aggravated robbery, a first degree felony following a jury trial
before the Honorable Judge Stanton M. Taylor on the 2nd and 3rd day
of September, 1992.

Defendant was sentenced on the charge on the

28th day of September 1993 to serve a term in the Utah State Prison
of not less than five (5) and which may be for life at the Utah
State Prison.
The Defendant filed for post conviction relief requesting that
he be granted an appeal which was received by the Clerk of the
Judicial District Court, County of Weber, State of Utah on the 7th
day of October, 1992.
This appeal, which was directed to the Court of Appeals for
the State of Utah, for which, on the 9th day of October 1992,
Geoffrey J.

Butler, Clerk of the Court of Appeals, filed a

certificate on Appeal No. 92085CA on the 7th day of October, 1992.
That on the 9th day of October 199 2 the Defendant signed the
affidavit of Impecuniosity which was filed with the Clerk of Weber
County, and that counsel, John T. Caine, was appointed to represent
the

Defendant

as

the

result

of

the

Defendant's

motion

for

appointment of counsel to represent him in this appeal which was
2

received by the Clerk of the District Court of Weber County.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On the 16th day of June 1992, at approximately 10:00 o'clock
p.m., Mrs. Anthea

Benally was

employed

Washington Blvd, Ogden, Weber County, Utah.

by

Kar Kwik

at 710

Some minutes before

10:00 p.m. Mrs Benally was at the check out counter and her coworker, Brent Hoth, was working in another part of the store. At
that time there was only one other person in the store.

Mrs

Benally testified that she was in approximately the middle of the
store looking over the merchandise. Eventually that person grabbed
some chips and brought them over to the counter. That person threw
the chips on the counter and asked for a package of cigarettes.
(Tp. 17)

Mrs. Benally reached for the requested cigarettes and

then started to ring up the sale.

As Mrs. Benally was ringing up

the sale, the customer came beside Mrs. Benally and in a quiet
voice said " This is a robbery11.

Mrs. Benally questioned whether

the customer was serious. (Tp. 19)

The customer to show he was

serious grabbed Mrs. Benallyfs arm and placed the scissors to a
point about five inches from Mrs. Benally!s body.

Mrs. Benally

finally opened up the till and the customer reached in the till,
grabbed all the paper money and stuffed it in a side pocket of a
jacket he was wearing.

The customer warned Mrs. Benally not to

call the cops and then walked out the side door and into a dark
area, from which neither Mrs. Benally or her assistant were able to
see him again. Immediately thereafter, Mrs. Benally called the
police. The Police arrived in approximately ten minutes.
3

During

the call she had described the robber to the police.
Approximately

twenty

minutes

later

the

police

take Mrs.

Benally to the vicinity of 27th and Monroe, where they showed to
her a young black man they had in custody.

Mrs. Benally identified

that man as the one who had robbed her (Tp. 25) .

To be sure Mrs.

Benally requested that the police have the suspect walk closer to
the police car and shine the brighter lights on his face.
Benally

then was

sure of the

identity

of the

suspect

Mrs.

as the

individual who robbed her on the 16th of June (Tp. 48)
Next Mrs. Benally went to the police station in the middle of
the 2 600 block of Washington Blvd in Ogden at the request of the
police.

There the suspect walked down the hallway, where Mrs.

Benally again identified the same person as the one who held the
scissors to her and robbed the store (Tr. 47). However, from the
beginning Officer Stubbs of the Ogden City Police Department was
talking Mrs. Benally out of identifying the first suspect as the
individual who committed the crime. (Tp. 118)
Later Mrs. Benally was asked to identify the Defendant from
multiple pictures which she was shown at the preliminary hearing on
the 25th of June, 1992.

At that time the police did not include

the picture of the suspect she had previously identified, but did
include a picture of the Defendant.

From those pictures Mrs.

Benally picked the Defendant as the individual who robbed the store
(Tp. 51,52)
Early in the morning of the 17th of June, 1992 one, Gayle
Herrera, left the Defendant and went to the police station in
4

Ogden, Utah.

She was directed to officer Stubbs, where she related

that she had been with the Defendant prior to and subsequent to the
robbery of the Kar Kwik.

(Tp. 84) .

Ms. Herrera

indicated

to

Officer Stubbs that the Defendant and she parked his automobile in
back of Kar Kwik on 7th and Washington Blvd, that the Defendant
left the car allegedly to borrow some money and when the Defendant
came back the Defendant and Ms Herrera drove away (Tp. 84-88).
After Ms. Herrera

told her

story

to Officer

Stubbs, the

officer requested Ms. Hererra help him find where the Defendant
lived.

Ms. Hererra went with Officer Stubbs to locate the car, a

gray Buick Riveria, which they found parked by a tree and some
other businesses, and then located the apartment number where the
Defendant was staying. (Tp. 92-93, 125)
Subsequently, Officer Stubbs took a surveillance team out to
the apartment.

Then Officer Stubbs left to obtain search warrants

for both the car and the apartment (Tp. 127)
Sometime around 2:00 PM on the 17th of June, 1992, Office
Stubbs, with three other Ogden City policeman and one officer from
the Clearfied, Utah police Department knocked on the door of the
apartment

to

apartment

and

execute

the

searching

search

the

warrant.

apartment

the

Upon

entering

officers

found

the
the

Defendant in the middle bedroom.
At that point Officer Stubbs indicated that "I took him into
custody without incident. (Tp. 132). Officer Stubbs believed that
he had arrested the Defendant for the robbery of the Kar Kwik store
on the evening of the 16th of June, 1992 (Tp. 133).
5

After the Defendant was taken into custody, Officer Stubbs
testified that "Claude appeared quite upset and interrupted me
saying. "This is the —

this is the critical phrase - - "The coat

was in the closet. He'd been coked up at the time and would plead
guilty.

He threw the scissors somewhere, but doesn't know where

because he was coked up." (Tp. 133-134, 143)

Immediately after

making the statement Officer Stubbs decided that he had better read
him his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, supra. (Tp. 135, 143)
After reading the Defendant his Miranda rights, the Defendant made
no further statements about the crime (Tp. 136,137, 143)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The

evidence

demonstrate

his

of
guilt

Defendants
of

guilt

aggravated

was

insufficient

robbery.

Given

to
the

circumstances involved in this case that the primary witness,
who was also the victim in the case, within a short time after the
commission of the crime, twice identified, not by photographs, but
after personal inspection, first by auto lights, and then in better
light at the police station, another person as the perpetrator of
the crime, and only after affirmative persuasion and a photo review
that did not contain a photo of the prior suspect, did she identify
the Defendant as the perpetrator of the crime and also that the
only other witness was shown only a photo of the Defendant and not
the other suspect, casts doubt as to the validity of their identity
of the suspect as the perpetrator of the robbery.
Defendant, after being

Second, the

in custody and being served

a search

warrant, WHICH CONFESSION RESULTED DIRECTLY FROM THE FUNCTIONAL
6

EQUIVALENT OF INTERROGATION BY THE POLICE DEPARTMENT, but before
his Miranda rights were given, made a confession, which confession
was admitted

in evidence of the objections of Counsel

for the

Defendant was harmful error in that it significantly led to the
conviction of the Defendant for the crime in question.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO PROVE
THE DEFENDANT GUILTY BEYOND A
REASONABLE DOUBT OF AGGRAVATED ROBBERY
The

standard

established

for

an Appellate

sufficiency of evidence is well established.

review

of

the

The Utah Supreme

Court has stated:
"It is the prerogative of the jury to judge the
credibility of the witnesses and to determine the
facts; that the evidence will be reviewed in the lines
most favorable to the verdict; and that if when so
viewed it appears that the jury acting fairly and
reasonably could find the Defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt the verdict will not be disturbed.11
Citing

case

State v. Ward,

347

P. 2d

865, 869

(1959

footnote

omitted.)
The Utah State Supreme Court has held in State v. Booker, 709
P.2d, 342 Utah 1985:
"That we review the evidence and all inferences which may
be reasonably drawn from it in the light most favorable
to the verdict of the jury. We reverse a jury conviction
for insufficient evidence only when the evidence, so
viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a
reasonable doubt that the Defendant committed the crime
of which he was convicted".
See also State v. McCardell, 652 P.2d, 942 (Utah 1982),
State v. Martinez, 709 P. 2d, 355 (Utah 1985). However, the Utah
7

Supreme

Court

has

indicated

an

unwillingness

to

stretch

the

inference beyond gaps in the evidence as in the case of
State v. Petree, 659 P.2d, 443,444

(Utah 1983), where the Court

said:
"Notwithstanding the presumptions in favor of the jury f s
decision this Court still has the right to review the
sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict. The
fabric of evidence against the Defendant must cover the
gap between the presumption of innocence and the proof of
guilt."
The Defendant was convicted of Aggravated Robbery.

Section

76-6-302 of the Utah Code Annotated indicates that:
(1) A person commits aggravated

robbery

in the course of

committing robbery, he:
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined
in Section 76-1-601; or
(b) causes serious bodily injury to another.
•k'k'kick'k'k-k-k'k'k'k

Section

76-6-301, UCA

intentional

taking

defines

robbery

of personal

property

as

ff

in

the
the

unlawful
possession

and
of

another from his person, or immediate presence, against his will,
accomplished by means of force or fear.11
To convict the Defendant of this charge the jury not only had
to find that under the definition of that statute an aggravated
robbery actually did occur but also that they were convinced beyond
a reasonable doubt that the Defendant actually was present at the
scene and perpetrated that offense.
The focus of this appeal is whether the jury could reasonably
believe that the Defendant, Mr. Hayes, was the person who actually
8

committed the robbery, after the victim first had twice identified
another suspect as the perpetrator of the crime, and the Ogden City
Police Department deliberately and conscientiously convinced the
victim that she was wrong in her first and second identification of
the perpetrator of the crime.
There is no dispute that Kar Kwik convenience store at 710
Washington Blvd, Ogden, Utah was robbed by a black male wearing a
dark blue, slick looking jacket at approximately 10:00 p.m. on the
evening of June 16, 1992. At the time of the robbery the principal
clerk, Mrs. Benally, was forced to open the till, where the
individual

grabbed

all the bills and departed.

Immediately

thereafter Mrs. Benally called the Ogden City Police Department to
report the robbery.

Within approximately one hour after the

robbery the Ogden Police Department took Mrs. Benally to the
vicinity of 27th and Monroe in Ogden for the purpose to identify a
potential suspect.

Upon arriving at 27th and Monroe the suspect

was standing in front of the police car.

After some looking and

requesting the suspect to be brought closer to the headlights of
the police car for better view, Mrs. Benally identified the suspect
as the individual who had robbed her that evening in the said Kar
Kwik location.

The police then drove Mrs. Benally to the police

station in the 2 600 block of Washington Blvd in Ogden, where Mrs
Benally in full light again saw the suspect walking down the hall.
Again after seeing another view of the suspect she again identified
him as the perpetrator of the robbery. Mrs. Benally was confident
that she had identified the robber, and except for the actions of
9

Officer Stubbs of the Ogden City Police Department would have been
in Court testifying against that suspect rather than the Defendant.
This is because at that moment she was convinced that the police
had apprehended the right suspect.

Shortly afterwards, Officer

Stubbs showed Mrs. Benally photographs of other black individuals,
including the Defendant, but not the individual Mrs. Benally had
previously identified as the perpetrator, for identification.

At

which time she identified the Defendant as the perpetrator of the
crime.

Since the Defendants photograph and the initial suspect's

photographs were not both included together it is purely conjecture
which of the two individuals she would have identified, had the
police

included

both

photographs.

Moreover,

it

is

further

conjecture of whether Mrs. Benally would have remained convinced
she had identified the correct suspect, except for the affirmative
action of the Ogden City Police Department in convincing her she
had identified an innocent suspect.
No further action was taken until Gayle Herrera, an admitted
drug addict, came voluntarily to Officer Stubbs and tells her
story, implicating the Defendant as the perpetrator of the crime.
Gayle Herrera visits Officer Stubbs at approximately 4:00 a.m.
and tells the officer a story about the robbery of the Kar Kwik the
previous evening. She admits that she had known the defendant only
a couple of days, during which they had both been using drugs and,
in fact, were both high on drugs the evening of the Sixteenth of
June.

Never did Ms. Herrera see the Defendant enter the Kar Kwik

which was robbed, nor did the Defendant admit that he had just
10

robbed the convenience store.

In fact, the Defendant told Ms.

Hererra that he was going to borrow some money. Ms. Hererra had no
personal knowledge that, in fact, the Defendant either intended to
or did rob the said Kar Kwik.
However, she did have personal knowledge of the make, color,
and partial license plate of the car the defendant was driving, and
also where the Defendant was residing.

With that knowledge Ms.

Hererra showed Officer Stubbs the location of the automobile and
also where the Defendant was staying.
Based upon that information Officer Stubbs put a surveillance
on the automobile and the apartment house, and also obtained a
search warrant to search the car and the apartment for both
scissors and a blue jacket.
Taking

three other Ogden City

Police Officers plus one

Clearfied, Utah Police Officer to the apartment, he knocked on the
door, was admitted into the apartment by another black male,
believed to be the Defendant's brother and began a search of the
apartment. Pursuant to that search the Defendant was located in a
middle bedroom.
custody.

First, Officer Stubbs took the Defendant into

Second, Officer Stubbs identified himself as Detective

Stubbs from the Ogden City Police Department. Third, informed the
Defendant he was investigating the Kar Kwik robbery at 7th and
Washington and that he believed that the Defendant did it.

In

fact, Officer Stubbs told the Defendant that the person driving his
car had given him up.

Fourth, that he was there with a search

warrant, was going to search the house for the coat and the
11

scissors used in the robbery.
Next, Officer Stubbs testified that the Defendant appeared
quite upset at that time, and interrupted what he was saying by
telling him the coat was in the closet.

The Defendant had been

coked up at the time and would plead guilty.

The Defendant said

that he had thrown the scissors somewhere, but he doesn't know
where because he was coked up.
Finally, Officer Stubbs testified that he interjected with the
Miranda

warnings

and

the

Defendant

said

nothing

else

after

receiving the Miranda warnings.
The United States Court of Appeals for 7th Circuit ruled in
Webster v. Duckworth, 767 F.2d, 1206, (1985),:
"That the absence of competence substantive evidence to
support a verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt,
whether the result of prosecutorial inability, judicial
error or recalcitrant witness requires acquittal either
at trial or on appeal."
The Supreme Court of Washington considered this general rule in the
case of State v. Allen, 574 P. 2d, 1182, (1978) where the Court
ruled that:
"Doubt of guilt cannot co-exist with conviction of guilt;
any fact in evidence may, under particular circumstances,
raise doubt of guilt which would not otherwise exist, if
doubt is raised, it follows that jury is not convinced
beyond a reasonable doubt of guilt of Defendant and must
acquit."
The

Supreme

Court

of

the

State

of

Utah

confirmed

the

Defendant's theory in the case of State v. Mecham, 456 P. 2d 156,
(1969);

where

although

the

Court

affirmed

the

Defendant's

conviction, the Court indicated that:
"Not withstanding the fact that exact date of indecent
12

assault was never made a particular issue at the trial bynotice of alibi or otherwise, except as witnesses were
questioned as to what happened on that date, State had
the burden to prove Defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt, and this evidence of Defendant's being elsewhere
was sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to his
being involved in the crime, he should be acquitted."
This language relates to the present case and shows that the
Supreme Court is cognizant of the potentiality of a jury conviction
when the facts seem to preclude the possibility of the Defendant
actually

committing

the

offense.

The

Court

is clear

in

its

assertion that in such a case the Defendant is to be acquitted.
The Utah Supreme Court stated the rule to be used in Utah
regarding sufficiency of the evidence in State v. Romero, 554 P. 2d,
216, 1976:
"The status is of the standard
for determining
sufficiency of evidence is whether it is so inconclusive
or inherently improbable that reasonable minds could not
reasonably believe the Defendant had committed a crime.11
In the present case the jury gave unreasonable credibility to
the testimony of Mrs. Benally in believing her identification of
the Defendant after she had first been convinced of the innocence
of the first suspect. Further, the second and only other witness to
the commission of the crime, Brent Hoth, despite the fact that he
was in the police station at the same time as the first suspect,
never was asked to view that suspect to determine if he believed
said

individual

committed

the

crime.

(Tp.

72,

Lines

11-33).

Further, Mr. Hoth was shown pictures of the Defendant and other
black

individuals, but did

suspect.

not

(Tp. 74 Lines 16-18)

include

a photo

of

the

first

Mr. Hoth admitted that he did not
13

get a good look at the perpetrator of the crime, (Tp. Lines 20-21)
and further described the perpetrator only in generic terms, black
male

5"9",

51

10", medium

build,

distinguishing marks, or identity

average

features

with

(Tp. 75, Lines 9-11).

description would fit many black individuals.

no
This

Further, Mr. Hoth is

not very helpful in describing the jacket the perpetrator wore the
night of the robbery.

He described it merely as "long sleeve,

something on, Navy blue".

(Tp. 76, Line 10)

could

jackets

also

fit

numerous

and

This description

contains

no

specific

identifying features.
The Defendant defends his position with the basic rule that a
conviction without evidence of guilt clearly violates his rights to
due process of law.
The Defendant points to the precedence set in United States
Supreme Court in Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 US 510, 1979; in which
the Court ruled that jury may not be instructed that:
"The law presumes that a person intends the ordinary
consequences of his voluntary acts."
Because of the 14th Amendment Due Process requirement, that
the State must prove each and every element of a defense beyond a
reasonable doubt and to accept the quoted presumption conflicts
with the stronger and overriding presumption of innocence, which
everyone accused of offense is entitled to.
The Utah Supreme Court followed this ruling in the case of
Utah v. Walton, 646 P.2d 689 (1982).

The Defendant argues that

this line of cases precludes situations, such as in the current
case,

where

the

Defendant

is

not
14

clearly

identified

as

the

perpetrator of the robbery and that, therefore, the jury is being
expected to presume that because he was tenuously identified as
being the robber, that he must have in fact committed the robbery
charged by the State.
evidence

is clearly

Such a presumption without any

violative

of the

Defendants

right

direct
to

due

process.
POINT II
Miranda Issue
THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN FAILING TO EXCLUDE
THE DEFENDANTS CONFESSION OF GUILT
MADE TO OFFICER STUBBS, IN VIOLATION OF THE
MIARANDA RULE (Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 US 436,
16 L.E. 2nd 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602
A fundamental right under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
to the Constitution of the United States and Article 1, Section 12
of the Constitution of the State of Utah is, no person shall be
compelled to give testimony against himself (self incrimination).
In the case of Miranda v. Arizona, supra the United States Supreme
Court held that the prosecution may not use statements, whether
exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation
of the Defendant, unless is demonstrates the use of procedural
safeguards

effective

to

secure

the

privilege

against

self-

incrimination. Rhode Island v. Innis (1980) 446 U.S. 291, 64 L.Ed.
2nd 297, 100 S. CT 1682, L ED at Page 305.
Based on the following uncontroverted facts it is argued that
the prosecution in using the Defendants admission of guilt violated
the Defendants right against self incrimination, as set forth in
the constitutions of the United States and the State of Utah.
15

On

the afternoon of June 16, 1992, Office Stubbs of the Ogden City
Police Depart, at approximately 2:00 p.m. with three other officers
of the Ogden Police Department and one Officer of the Clearfied,
Utah Police Department knocked on the door of an apartment in
Clearfied, Utah where they believed the Defendant was residing.

A

black male answered the door and Officer Stubbs asked for Claude
Hayes.
there.

Officer Stubbs was told by the male that Claude wasn't
However,

Officer

Stubbs

executed

the

search

warrant,

secured the house, place the black male and either his wife or
girlfriend

in the living

room, and

found

Claude Hayes

in the

bedroom with a sleeping child (Tp. 128, Lines 4-22).
Officer Stubbs next stated that he took the Defendant into
custody without incident. (Tp. 132 Line 12-13).

Officer stubbs

states that he next began explaining to Claude who he was and
exactly why he was there and that he had a search warrant for the
coat and scissors.

Officer Stubbs testified that "there should

have been no doubt in his mind he was under arrest for that robbery
(kar Kwik on 7th and Washington in Ogden) and I (Officer Stubbs)
believed

he did

it

(Tp. 133, L

10-12).

Officer

Stubbs

then

testified "Claude appeared quite upset and interrupted me saying - - the coat was in the closet.
would plead guilty.

He'd been coked up at the time and

He threw the scissors somewhere, but doesnfft

know where because he was coked up" (Tp. 134, Lines 2-5__.

After

making the above statement Officer Stubbs read him his Miranda
rights (Tp. 135 Lines 12-23).

After hearing the Miranda rights,

the Defendant made no further statements (Tp. 13 6, Lines 15-24)
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The Defendant's Counsel made a motion to exclude the testimony
of the confession, which motion to suppress was denied

(Tp. 140

Lines 17-23)
In the instant case there is no question that at the time the
Defendant made the admission of guilt he was in custody, nor is
there any question that such confession was orally relayed to the
Jury by Officer Stubbs. (Tp, 143 Lines 14-19).
The only questions are one, whether the confession was made as
a result of interrogation and two, whether such statement was
voluntary•
The United States Supreme Court in the case of
Rhode Island v. Innis, supra at Page 3 00 states:
"We conclude, that the Miranda safeguards come into play
whenever a person in custody is subject either to express
questioning or its functional equivalent.
That is to
say, the term "Interrogation" under Miranda refers not
only to express questioning, but also to any words or
actions on the part of police (other than those normally
attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should
know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating
response from the suspect. The latter portion of this
definition focuses primarily upon the perceptions of
suspect, rather than the intent of the police."
Here you have five police officers in an apartment, first
telling the other occupants in the apartment to stay away from the
suspect and then in a relatively small apartment, Officer Stubbs,
first, places the Defendant under arrest, second, explains to the
Defendant who Officer Stubbs was, third, tells the Defendant that
he believes the Defendant committed the robbery of the Kar Kwik at
7th and Washington Blvd in Ogden, fourth, tells the Defendant that
he believed he used a pair of scissors in the commission of the
17

crime and fifth, that he has a search warrant for the coat and
scissors.
In accordance with the standards established in Rhode Island
v. Innis, supra, his course of conduct was likely to elicit an
incriminating response from the Defendant.

Moreover, the conduct

of Officer Stubbs was as close as asking the Defendant, "Where are
the coat and scissors that you used to commit the robbery on the
night of June 16th at the Kar Kwik on 7th and Washington in Ogden
"without actually asking the question".
Moreover, as contrasted with State v. Kelly, 718 P 2nd 385
(198 6) this contact by Officer Stubbs was accusatory rather than
investigatory.

The Defendant was in sequence, taken into custody,

told he had committed a crime, defined the exact crime he was
accused of, served a search warrant for a coat and scissors used in
the

crime, made

an

incriminating

statement

and

then

read

his

Miranda rights.
The last question raised is whether the confession of the
Defendant was given voluntarily.

The Utah Supreme Court in the

case of State v. Bishop, 753 P 2nd 439 (1988) at Page 463 states:
"When the State seeks to use an allegedly involuntary
confession against a criminal defendant at his or her
trial, he or she is "entitled to a reliable and clear-cut
determination that the confession was voluntarily
rendered." Lego v. Twomey 404 US 417, 92 S. Ct 619, 627,
30 L.Ed. 2nd 618 (1972). In this regard, the State bears
the burden of proving by at least a preponderance of the
evidence that the confession was voluntarily given.
In the instant case the Defendant was induced by accusatory conduct
of Officer stubbs into giving the involuntary confession of the
robbery of the Kar Kwik, which confession was testified
18

to by

Officer Stubbs over the objection of Defendant's Counsel. (Tp.
Pages 138-140) The confession served as the king-pin of the States
case and without it, given the conflict existing in the evidence,
it is reasonable to conclude that the Defendant would have been
acquited.
CONCLUSION
The Defendant Claude L. Hayes was improperly charged and
convicted of aggravated robbery in violation of the due process
clause of the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution. The
Defendant alleges that the jury convicted him on no substantial
evidence that he in fact committed this crime, and that the
evidence presented at trial cast doubt on the initial identity of
the individual who committed the robbery and further the Court
admitted the Defendant's involuntary confession, given before his
Miranda rights were read to him.

That, therefore, because of the

faulty identification and if his confession is disregarded he is
entitled to an acquittal on this charge.

Inherent within this

insufficiency of the evidence argument is if the primary witness
had not been coached by the police as to the identity of the
perpetrator of the crime and if no confession would have been
admitted the jury in this case would not of haj^ sufficient evidence
to convict him of aggravated robber.
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Q.

Okay.

And this one's for the —

is this one for

the outside -A.

The drive-up?

Q.

—

A.

The drive-up window and then there's the gas till

the drive-up window?

right here which is right by it.

And then there's

the other till.
Q.

So there's yet another -- so there were three

tills?
A.

Yeah, except for the one you don't ring in.

It's

just to put the gas money in.
Q.

Okay.

A.

And he came up and he threw a bag of chips on the

counter and -Q.

When you say "he", let me ask you, is that person

here in the courtroom today?
A.

Uh huh.

Q.

Would you point him out to the jury, please?

A.

He's riqht there.
MR. DAROCZI:

Indicating the

defendant, for the record, Your Honor.
THE COURT:

Yes.

Q.

(By Mr. Daroczi)

A.

He threw them on the counter and then he asked

»*M

»*

IUII'K

HI

Okay.

\i|\]aiu((ciu.

l ilwuujht he said Kool
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was about right here.
said:

And he said real quietly, he

This is a robbery.
And I looked at him and laughed because I

thought that he was just joking.

And then he goes:

I'm serious, this is a robbery and I want you to open
up the till now.
And he just said that he wanted me to open up
the till now.

And -- and then after that it was like

I could see him starting to —

you know, he had a

pair of scissors which he had held
Q.

Let me stop you here, Anthea.

A.

Okay.
MR. DAROCZI:

scissors here?

—

Do we have a pair of

Maybe you could show us.

if we have a pair here.

Let's see

(Clerk gives Mr. Daroczi

scissors. )
Q.

(By Mr. Daroczi)

Would this be something

similar?
A.

Yeah.

Q<

Okay.

Why don't you be -- why don't you be him

and show us how this was ~- this was held.
let's see, I'll be you then.

Okay?

A.

Okay.

Q.

Did he hold them in the right hand?

A.

Yeah, he had them in the right hand.
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Q.

Okay.

What denominations, roughly?

A.

Just twenties, tens, and whatever was in the

twenties drawer, I think.
Q.

Okay.

A.

Yeah.

Q.

Okay.

Did the police come shortly thereafter?

And did you describe the person who robbed

you?
A.

I described him on the phone to them whenever I

called.
Q.

Right on the phone?

A.

Yeah.

Q.

Okay.

A.

Uh huh.

Q.

Okay.

And did they also come to the store?

Were you taken to a location at 20 —

was

it 23rd and Monroe?
A.

27th and Monroe.

Q.

27th and Monroe, rather?

A.

Yeah.

Q.

Okay.

A.

Yeah.

Q.

Okay.

There was a young black man there?

You identified that person as your -- as

the person who robbed you; is that correct?
A.

I did.

Q.

And then you did that again when you were taken

to the station, the police station; is that right?
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Now, let's look down at the specific questions
on page two, if you would.
about the top of that —

And if you would look to

I think it's the third

question down after you have given a description.
The question is, "Since the robbery, have you seen
this person tonight? 11
Is that the question?
A.

Uh huh.

Q.

And what was your answer?

A.

I put "Yes".

Q.

All right.

Second question, "Where did you see

him at?"
And what was your answer?
A.

I put, "Where the police took me to identify, and

walking through here."
Q.

"Where police took me to identify him" -- that's

27th and Monroe -- "and walking through here."
A.

Uh huh.

Q.

"Here" means the station?

A.

Which was the hallway that he walked down.

Q.

Next question, "The person that you identified,

is it the same person that held the scissors to you
and robbed the store?"
And your answer was?
A.

I put, "Yes".
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Q.

Okay.

"What happened when police showed you this

person?"
Ana your answei v.^^!
A.

"I looked at him and I didn't think it was him

because the clothing and the lighting was different.
He definitely changed his jacket.

Then he walked

closer with -- walked closer with the brighter lights
on his face, then I recognized him as the same
person. "
Q.

Okay.

Let's stop right there.

A.

Okay.

Q.

"Then he walked closer with the brighter light on

his face, then I recognized him as the same person."
When you're relating that in your statement,
is that the incident up at 27th and Monroe

—

A.

Uh huh.

Q.

-- you've just told us about?

A.

Uh huh.

Q.

Okay.

A.

"Then when I saw him here in the office he looked

over —
Q.

Go to the next part of your answer.

he looked over here and I knew it was him."

"Then when I saw him here in the office he looked

over here and I knew it was him."
A.

Uh huh.

Q.

Are those your words?
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A.

Uh huh.

2

Q.

Became more sure of your identification after he

3|

was placed in the headlights of a vehicle, and then

4 I

when he came down here to the station in the full

5

light of the police office, became even more

6

certain --

7

A.

8

Q.

9

in your statement.

Uh huh.
of your identification, and that's reflected
Isn't that true?

10

A.

It's true.

11

Q.

Not only -- you not only talk about height and

12

size and color and that sort of thing, but especially

13

getting into the specifics of a smirk on his face and

14

distinguishable eyebrows.

1!)

A.

Uh huh.

J&

Q-

Right?

17

the

18

of any other individuals.

19

A.

And the only time after that —

jury is clear, you were never shown photographs

Between what time?

20

Q

21

that

-

Between that evening and a preliminary hearing
was

hel

^ on the 25th of June.

Were you shown

some photographs?
23

'

24
2

5 |

A

*

so that

Yedh

/

I

was

shown some p h o t o g r a p h s .

Q.

Okay.

Did you pick a n y o n e out t h e r e ?

A.

Yeah, I d i d .
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Q.

When did you do that?

A.

Shoo.

I —

oh, gol.

I can't remember the exact

date.
Q.

Okay.

Was it within weeks of this or a month

later or when was it?
A.

It was shortly after.

Q.

Okay.

A.

Stubbs did.

Q.

Uh huh.

And who showed you these photographs?

And did he tell you at the time that the

individual that you had previously identified, he
felt wasn't the man?
A.

No, he didn't.

Q.

Did he tell you he felt he had an alibi?

A.

No.

Q.

If you'd already made an identification, did they

tell you why they were asking you to look at other
photographs?
A.

Just to make sure -- make certain.

Q.

Just to make certain.

Okay.

Do you know whose picture you picked out of
there?
A.

The second time?

Q.

Yeah.

A.

The second time I picked his picture

(indicating).
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Q.

It's a different fellow.

A.

Yes.

Q.

Does the name "Zaugg"

A,

Yes,

Q.

-- ring a bell with you?

A.

Yeah.

Q.

All right.

—

Now, let me have you take a look at

that, just so, again, that the jury understands.

The

first part of that statement is a narrative, is it
not?
A.

Yeah.

Q.

In other words, you were just asked to describe

what happened and you did so in your own words; is
that correct?
A.

Yeah.

Q.

And then you were asked some specific questions

and you responded to that.

Is that, also, true?

A.

Yeah.

Q.

And then after this was all done, it was typed

up.

Were you given an opportunity to read this

before you signed it?
A.

Yeah.

Q.

Did you read it?

A.

Yeah.

Q.

And does it accurately reflect your words -- this
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that same evening that may have been in the
vicinity -- one of whom had a blue jacket on -- and
asked to look at any of them?
A.

No.

Q.

All right.

So the only time you made an

identification then was afber this incident, you were
shown some photographs; is that right?
A.

Yeah.

Q.

You picked one out; is that correct?

A.

Yeah.

Q.

And then you went to a preliminary hearing where

this defendant was seated there in the courtroom,
basically, ready to go to hearing at that time, and
you picked him out then; is that right?
A.

I don't think I went to the preliminary.

Q.

You didn't go to the prelim.

So all you've done

is seen some photographs; is that right?
A.

Yeah.

Q.

Not asked to make any other

A.

No.

Q.

Until today.

A.

Yeah.

Q.

All right.

identifications?

There are no other black males in

this courtroom today, are there?
A.

I don't believe there are.
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Q.
A.

Q.

Take a look around just to make sure.
No.

Okay.

Now, let's take a look at your statement

for a minute, if you'll follow down with me to the
specific questions, down there I believe it's the
fourth question.

It says, question, "Can you

describe the person who robbed the store?"
And will you read your answer, please?
A.

"He was a black male, 5'9", 5'10", medium build,

average face.

I don't remember if he had facial

hair. ,f
Q.

Okay.

Stop right there.

description, isn't it?
average face.

That's your total

" S ' ^ ' , 5'10 n , medium build,

I don't remember if he had facial

hair. !l
A.

Well, the other

—

Q.

Well, we'll talk about -- then we're talking

about what he had on.
A.

Okay.

Q.

But in terms of physical description of the

individual, that's a]1 you said, isn't it?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Average face, 5' 9" or 5 M 0 " , medium build.

don't
A.

know

Yuah.

if ho had any faoial hair.
I think

1 iniiti that

I

That's it.

1 think he might have
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had some facial hair, but -Q.

Well, this says I don't remember if he had facial

hair-

Is that

—

A.

Yeah.

Q.

-- what you signed, at least?

A.

Uh huh,

Q.

Okay.

ahead.

That's it.

Read on.

Then you say -- well, go

What did you -- what did you next

say?
A.

"Long sleeve something on, navy blue.11

Q.

Okay.

Stop right there.

That's your only

description of any kind of a jacket, isn't it?

"Long

sleeve something on, navy blue'1?
A.

Yeah.

Q.

Now, Mr. Daroczi has stood up in the courtroom

today and waved State's Exhibit Number Two at you,
and you said, that's it.

Right?

A.

Yeah.

Q.

Did you tell them, in your statement, that it had

a hood on it?
A.

No.

Q.

Did you tell them that it had a lining that

looked like that in it?
A.

No.

Q.

Okay.

All you said is you saw something long
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have to tell the truth?
A.

Yeah.

Q.

Otherwise, you'll be committing a perjury.

1v.

Right.

Q.

would be another felony.
Right.

Q.

r

ou don't want to do that, do you?

A.
All right.

On the morning of June 17th, about

four o'clock, did you come into the police station
and talk to Detective Stubbs?
Yes.
At that point, how long had you known the
defendant seated there, approximately?
\ couple of days.

7e had been -- we'd been kicking it together.
What does that

mean?

Hanging ,n nnini with each other, getting high
together.
Q.

Okay.

What are you down here -- down at the

prison for now?
A.

Because I'd been to prison before, and drugs.
u

t,.

What are you in for?

.

You ran into an undercover agent this

lid you?

Laurie Shingle,
C.S.R.
(801)
399-8510

?5

A.

Yeal1, ilh h u h .

Q.

What happened the evening of June 16th, \i few

1(

. •

..calked

I: :• Det e ct i v e

Stubbs, sometime after nine o'clock?

Would you tell

this jury here?
\ 7 >i i.3 ci

i t 1 :)e ; 11 ] right

I went a

: •

before I went in, and tried to clear my name from
this stuff?
Q.

I'm sorry.

Are you asking me a quest io 111

A.

Do you mean the night before or the night that I

went to talk to Stubbs?

You mean a few hours before

that?
Q.

The evening before.

A.

day.

I was really 1liglI.

Me and Claude was out

cruising around in his car.
Q.

Claude, meaning this gentleman here

(indicating

the defendant)?
A.

Yeah.

C.

Okay.

A.

Y

Q.

Buick Riviera?

A.

Yeah.

(!

A.

His car.

What kind of car?

he Riviera, gray Riviera.

"i

We had been cruising around in his car getting

high together.

Okay.

Right before I went and told
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Stubbs what happened, Claude pulls over on the side
.-•I the- road and tells me that I have to have sex witl
says •

" '

' ' i- in*

(

because 1 w '*l

l

< |»"

and I was -- but I needed the drugs so he -- we 1lad
sex.

Put it that way.
And then it made me mad, so I went a::i :i 1: J : >] < i

Stubbs what he did at the Kar Kwik.
Q.

All right

What did he do at the Kar Kwik?

A.

Parked in the back of Kar Kwik.

Tell

He told me to

wait for him, that he was going to go borrow some
ley.

He didn'

to go rob it.
Q.

ell me the truth th'

He came back --

Who drove up there towards that part of —

the

i lor ti I part
A.

I drove the car away after the -- away after he

did it.
i'

kav.

Now, who drove as you were going up there,

up to the north part of town?
A.

Claude drove up there and then I drove -- 1le

drove away by the park that the river runs by.
Q.

Park Boulevard there?

A.

Yeah.

»

Okay.

A.

And then I drove the rest up the hill.
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>j.

f>v-v.

And did you park —

okay.

Tell us now,

happens
11 .i he park 01 in-, did -~
lie parked the car and told me to wait for him.
waited ~~
Q.

Did he say what he was going to do?

A.

He said he was going to go borrov; some money from

some cousins, family members.
Q.

All right.
He went in -- Ile went in wherever he went.

I was

still pushing my pipe.
Q.

Did you see a place down the street?

Could you

see?
A.

I wasn't looking.
But I mean, could you?
Yeah

At ter I seen there was one Kar Kwi

All right.
Which was the only store around.

But I wasn't worried about what he was doing.

I

was more worried about pushing my pipe.
nderstand.
A.

And when he came back he was all sweaty and stuff

and like scared and telling me -Q

I low much ] onger —

how 1 ong was he goi ie?
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A,

About 15 minutes.

Q.

All right.

A,

||«< was —

Q.

When you say "he came back really fast"

).-

back really fast.
w.i:- he

walking or was he running?
A,

Basically running --

Q.

Okay.
He was all sweaty like he 7 d been doing

back.
something.
Q.

So, anyways --

Was he wearing any

- what was he wearing?

was wearing his blue jacket.
Q.

Blue jacket.

A.

It looks like that's it right there.
State7'". K •«;)] i h i t Two?

A.

Yeah.

Q.

Blue jacket?

1.

Yeah.

Q.

Okay.

A.

I was cold.

*

.

Because I wore it for a wh

So when you unsnap this, there'1 s a 1: i : :)ci

that comes out?
A.

Uh huh.

Q.

Wasii

l

. .

:he

hood

down or was the hood showing?

--

was

tl li s

t i itt

Was the hood up

head or how was it?
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construction.
3id y o u p o i n t t h a t car out to S t u b b s ?
Yea 1 i i

c 11 • :i 1 : 1 < i :i I Stubbs ran --

and said Gayle, could it be Claude?
of „

y O U know what?

And

;

.-. ; .

I thought it was Bonnie -- you

know Bonnie and Clyde?
Q .

': ••

A.

Because I went to C.C. and 1 told C.C.,

this guy,

he told me his name was Claude -- Clyde -Claude, and I -- anyway, I told Stubbs I think *l
Claude.
Q.

Claude or Clyde?

A.

Clyde.

Q

Clyde.

A.

And then when it

Okay.
came back as Claude, then I

said, yeah, that's it.
Q

1

when the registration was checker

on and came back?
A,

Ye< i,l I

Q

Came back as Claude Hayes?

A.

IJ I: l

Q.

And then y o u r e m e m b e r e d the name?
I 11 : ] • :i S11 i b 1 : «s 1 I c i I: 11 i < I a real s 1 i o r t ] a s t

A
name.
Q.

Okay.

Oka>-

And so you spot the c a r , and what
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about his —

the apartment or -- was this an

apartment or a house?
!:: v ras ai 1 apartment.
Okay.
A.

Was this an apartment complex?

Yeah, but we didn L know the number, so I got out

and went and looked at it.
Q.

Did you go with Stubbs?

A.

1 1 :t 1 i 11: I

Q.

Okay.

A.

But Stubbs told me not to get out because

S t u bbs stayed in the car.

it was

dangerous, and I told him that I wanted to do 11Iis
Q.

Okay.

So what did you do?

A.

I went out and got the apartment number.

i> ,

Okay.

A.

I can't remember what it was, but I came back and

I told Stubbs.

When I was walking across the street,

w e c o i i ] ( 11

I: f j i i c I I: 1 i e c a r .

whatever.

The car was over by a tree.

Q.

Surveillance car?

W e w e r e l i k e s u r v e > i i :t g - -

Oh, you mean his car was over

by a tree.
A.

Yeah.

Q.

Okay.

any —

Was there any mention or did you see

any v/eapons, anything that might be a weapo:./
:di Claude got in the car though he said,

!fWha*

hem scissors? 11 .
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Correct.

Q.

Okay.

So M e l v i n W h i t e

is also b r o u g h t

to

the

stat i 01 1?
A.

Correct.

Q.

You talked to

A.

Yeah.

Q.

Did you h a v e some - - w h a t

about her
Well,

Anthea?

identifying
initially,

witness descriptions

Melvin

White?

I didn't, really.

jiess d e s c r i p t i o n s
weakest

are p r o b a b l y

-- w e a k e s t

identifications

link

are

right off the b a t , and with
11 Iat Mr

It's

it i s .

excellent.
lot of

weight

-- it's a l s o my

M e l v i n had

alibi w h i c h we w e r e starting

to check

beer
out.

So I tried to shake her i d e n t i f i c a t i o n
I even talked
office

> Melvin

won't

least

in a case

So I d o n ' t give them a w h o l e

understanding

excellent,

In o t h e r s , they

not a l w a y s that w a y , but on an a v e r a g e
Sometimes

Understand,

in one case will be

the p e r s o n will be right on.

strong

f e e l i n g s d i d y o u 11 a \r e

-- when

-- and was s u c c e s s f u l .

before

I talked
By the t i m e I had

finished t a l k i n g with h e r , her i d e n t i f i c a t i o n w a s

>

l o n g e r positive,, tl 101 igi I she felt it ma;

t.

still.
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this suspect , this person v/ho she was i.ilkinq ^l.ont : '
A.

Correct.

On the morning of the 18th r 1 believe,

",iV

ic^i UL> how that went.

i,: ....: . . * the office 11 Ie mori I :i, i i g • : f 1 1 Ie ] 811 i
and she was straight -- excuse me -- at that time.
L.oia ner I ileeded her to take me to where this
apartment that she had been to.
that she could find it.

She seei ned confiden t

So I put her

"

the car and

followed her lead to the Clearfield area,, the
Windsong Apartments, I believe.

It's actually right

on the border of Clearfield and Layton.
V

-

A.

.

•

"

•'

".

And we were looking both for the car, because she

had remembered the license plate had a three eight
zei >,
Q.

not remember the rest of it.

This is before going down there she remembered

the three eight zero?
A.

Correct.

This is the first time I t a ] ) : e ; • :i t : 1: i e r

she remembered the three eight zero.
Q.

Okay.

A.

But she v'uuivi!! ' '• remember the rest of; h. ,

And

she felt confident it was also a gray Riviera, but
not a brand new one.

And she took me to the area of

the Windsong Apartments and immediately -- we
couldn't originally find the car because the entire
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apartment.

Records did show that that was listed

offi : i a] ] y as 1 iis residence.

And that if hi s car was

there, the chances are that he was there.

So I

wasn't going to let him disappear.
surveillance tear

t n both the

apartment and the car, with instructions that if
anyone came out and got in the car, they took the cai
wi t

t.

untiI I returned.

\ i -»

But they werer

While they sat on the car and the

house -- or the apartment, I came back in and
:>bta i i ied a search warrant for bo11 i 11: ie : a:i : ai I i 11 I€
residence.
Q.

Looking for

what did you put down that you

were going to 3ook for, search for?
A.

was looking for a blue coat and a pair of

scissors.
0

Okay.

A.

And I think that's primarily what I put down.
Okay.

A.

^ny

m oney

-- or did you

okay.

don't think I -- I don't think I put money

because it was generic, as we call it.
Q

( kay.

A

There's nothing -- nothing to distinguish

other money

any money anywhere that I could

cie tei i t i.:i i ie , so

—
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t h a t w h e r e it is?
Q•

Y e a h , I'm afao i 11

A.

0ka"v

(2 •

D o y o "i i : '

A.

Yeah.

I ' ^ ' e gc > t tha t m a r k e d on my c o m p u t e r c

r

'

-

.

The statement is, initially,

Claude attempting to blend with the fixtures

. i, ihe

iiuiiu bedroom. "
Do you see where we are now?
Yes.
^.

Yes.

All right.

statement

Now, at that point -- the next

*' I t ook him into custody without

incident. ,f
A.

Yes.

Q.

I assume from that that, in effect, y o \ i | ) ] < i c e ci

him u n d e r a r r e s t .
A.

Yes.
:hat r i g h t ?
Yes.
m a d e that c l e a r that t h a t ' s w 1 iat y< : I i wei : e

doing?
/as in c u s t o d y , u n d e r a r r e s t .
you tell him that
r

ou go

Yes.
11e \ ',i;, in11it•r

i\ that same s e n t e n c e s a y i n g ,

"I b e g a n

e x p l a i n i n g to C l a u d e w h o I w a s and e x a c t l y why 1 w a s
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there, and that I had a search warrant
and scissors."
That's correct.
A1 "! right

:- .

I 111 assuming in that

ai i I :: Drrect

me if I'm wrong -- you, in effect, said, you're under
arrest because I believe you committed the robbery at
Kar Kwik on ~~ at 7th and Washington

nqcien.

Or is that
A.

Whether or not I would have used those exact

words,

i^n'-h know, but there should hav

doubt in his mind he was under arrest for that
• -

s

Q.

Okay.

ia 1 believed he did it, yes.
We]] , that's what I'm gettii .

clear not only that he was under arrest, uui
was

fin

A.

Correct.

«,»

Okay.

|ni

mat

i robbery at Kar Kwik.

And that you believed that he'd u^-d a

.cissors.
He definitely should have got that impression,

yeah.
Q.

• * ;: • .

All right.

And this is after he was

taken into custody, correct?

Q

Ile got that impression.

All right.

You then say, "Claude appeared guite upset and
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interrupted me saying," this is the -- this is the
critical phrase -- "The coat was in the closet.

He'd

been coked up at the time and would plead guilty.

He

threw the scissors somewhere, but doesn't know where
because he was coked up."
A.

That's just about right.

Q.

All right.

you.

All right.

That's what he said to

And what I'm interested in is prior to saying

that, did you, in fact, say to him, tell me where the
scissors are because I know you've got them?
A.

No.

I was still explaining why we were there,

what I was looking for and what our intentions were.
Q.

All right.

That's what I want to be clear on.

We're here because I believe you committed a robbery
at Kar Kwik and you used a pair of scissors.
have a search warrant for those scissors.

And I

And I

think you had on a blue jacket, and I've got a search
warrant for that.
A.

I don't know if I described the jacket, but I

would have said the coat you were wearing.
Q.

Okay.

And I'm here -~ I've got a warrant -- I've

got a search warrant to look for those.
A.

Correct.

Q.

Okay.

Did you, in fact, say to him either show

me where the jacket is -- where is the jacket?
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are the scissors?
A.

No.

Q.

You did not.

You simply explained you were there

looking for those things.
A.

Yes.

Q.

Okay.

And that was my intention.
What I'm —

what I'm

interested in, did

you ask him a direct question concerning either the
coat or the scissors as to where they are, turn them
over to me, I want them, where are they, anything
like that?
A.

No.

Q.

All right.

So that what you're telling me is

that in the course of explaining to him why you were
there, then he made this statement.

And

immediately

upon making that statement, you then determined that
you should Mirandize him, at least as I read the next
sentence.
A.

I figured I'd better.

Q.

Yeah.

The next —

the next sentence says, "At

that point I interrupted.11

I think it's -- or

interjected, I think is what that says

—

"Interjected with Miranda. 11
A.

Yes.

Q.

All right.

in custody.

So, in effect then, you knew he was

No question in your mind about that.
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A.

2

Q. You were telling him that you believed he

3

committed a robbery and that you were, in fact, there

4

to look for two particular items:

5

that would have been the weapon; and a coat that he

6

had on.

7

A,

8

Q. And then he makes a comment which you immediately

9

recognized as a significant comment.

That's correct.

A pair of scissors

Correct.

At that point

10

you decide, I better Mirandize him.

1 1 i*

A.

12

minute.

13

Q . Okay.

14

A.

15

Q. And gave him what you would routinely give

16

someone that you were about to interrogate.

17

point then, he said nothing further after that; is

18

that right?

19

A. Well, he thought about it.

20 J

Q . But he didn't make any other statements.
A.

At the first

break I says,

you know, wait a

We've got to do this by the numbers.
And at that point you did Mirandize him.

Yes.

And then thought

that

he -- told me that

22 |

t h o u g h t that h e b e t t e r n o t say a n y t h i n g

23

Q.

U n t i l h e talked t o a l a w y e r .

24

A.

Basically, yes.

25

Q.

I think

is what y o u said.

he

further.

S o , in e f f e c t
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once you Mirandized him in the context of this
circumstance that we've just discussed, he made no
further statements concerning his involvement,
allegedly, in the Kar Kwik robbery,
A,

Correct.

Q.

All right.

And no further statements were taken

from him by you at a later date.
A.

Correct.

Q.

In connection with this.
MR. CAINE:

That's all I have, Your

Honor.
Do you have some questions?
MR. DAROCZI:

No.

THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. CAINE:

Having said that, in the

time between that I had, the small time at lunch -and I didn't get a chance to eat, which I'll

discuss

with the Court later -THE COURT:

Well, you've been saving

up for that for years.
MR. CAINE:

Yes, I know.

I knew it

wouldn't break your heart, Your Honor.
I had a chance to review the —

what I believe

at least to be -- the current view of the United
States Supreme Court and the Utah Supreme Court in
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this area.

And I'll acknowledge that the Court's

preliminary view this morning is accurate to this
extent, and that is that clearly the courts have said
that extemporaneous or -- or expostulative type
statements that are just thrown out are not
considered to be in violation of Miranda.
But these cases also -- particularly Gates
against Illinois which was the big -- the big one
where they talk about making some changes and some
others -- the clear implication is that police
officers need to be very careful in these areas, and
that the courts have the right to look at all of the
totality of what happened and make a decision as to
whether in this case it did violate Miranda.
And I would suggest in this case that while
it's clearly -- at least as described by Detective
Stubbs —

it's clearly in the nature of —

of

something coming out, not necessarily in response to
a direct question, you do have the other elements
that are significant.

You have a person who's

clearly placed under arrest.

No question about that.

This isn't even a detention situation.

He's under

arrest.
Secondly, he's told, I believe, in effect, you
committed a robbery.

Not only do I believe you
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confrontation at that point.

No question about it.

This wasn't just a, well, you may be a suspect, and
then it comes out.
You're it, I'm here, I got you, in effect.
And then a statement is made and then immediately we
go to Miranda.

It seems to me that this does fall

within the gambit of requiring that Miranda should
have been given as soon as that arrest was made and
the defendant was told exactly why they were there.
It's my view then that anything he said
subsequent to that time, even though it was in the
nature of a spontaneous kind of remark, we should
suppress it.

And that's our motion.
MR. DAROCZI:

I'll submit it, Your

Honor.
THE COURT:

Very well.

I don't think it would be appropriate for the
Court to extend Miranda beyond the boundaries that
have been laid down by both federal and state courts.
Since this was not in response to interrogation, and
even though it was clearly a custodial situation, the
Court believes that since it was not in response to
interrogation, the Motion to Suppress is denied.
MR. CAINE:
MR.

DAROCZI:

Thank you.
Your

Hor>or,
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